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Data for 1995 and 2005 on forty-two cities 
in the USA, Canada, Australia, Europe and 
Asia suggest that car use as well as total 
motorised mobility have decoupled from 
real growth in metropolitan GDPs. The 
car vehicle kilometres travelled per unit of 
GDP in thirty-nine out of the forty-two cit-
ies studied has reduced by an average of 
24%. In thirty-five or 83% of the cities, 
total motorised passenger kilometres trav-
elled per unit of GDP was lower in 2005 
than it was in 1995, by an average of 26%. 
Decoupling of urban mobility from GDP can 
occur in the context of still rising car use 
or total mobility. However, in twelve out of 
the forty-two cities the actual car use per 
capita also declined by an average of over 
6%. Overall, it is found that the average 
increase in car use in these forty-two cit-
ies from 1995 to 2005 was 7% or less than 
one-third of the level in the 1980s. This 
decoupling of car use from GDP growth is 
thus part of the ‘peak car use’ phenom-
enon. New data showing an improvement 
in the relative speed of public transport 
systems compared to general road traffic 
over many decades, which is being led by 
a strong global trend towards urban rail, 
may help to explain these results. Further 
research is needed to see if Chinese and 
Indian cities, with their heavy investments 
in rail, can also start to show a decoupling 
of passenger transport from GDP. Over-
all, the results suggest a possible future 
where wealth can continue to be created 
globally whilst reducing the use of cars, 
oil and their damaging global impacts. 
Keywords: car use per capita, GDP per 
capita, decoupling, peak car use, motor-
ised mobility, urban rail, relative speeds. 
Road planning in Germany:  an urgent 
need for reform
Prof. Dr.-Ing. Helmut Holzapfel
Institut für Verkehrswesen, Universität 
Kassel
Abstract:
In Germany in 1971 the basic plan for the 
construction of the federal road network 
was adopted. The existing planning pro-
cedures for motorways and roads since 
then only slightly changed: They oriented 
on paradigms as an ever-growing demand 
for transport and an optimal access to mo-
torways for high speeds. The article looks 
at the processes and their implications for 
the future.
Keywords: planning process, planning of 
motorways, transport infrastructure and 
economy
8 World Transport Policy and Practice
Volume  19.4 October 2013
 1 Note that some cities have 1995 and 2005 data 
and some have 1996 and 2006, depending on Cen-
sus years. For simplicity the data are referred to as 
1995 and 2005.
 2 All comparisons in the paper, which refer to GDP 
in US dollars, are performed on the basis of real 
dollars ($US1995). Currencies are converted to 
US dollars in the appropriate year using the IMF’s 
Standard Drawing Right found at: http://www.imf.
org/external/np/fin/data/param_rms_mth.aspx. All 
conversions are done as at 31/12 of the relevant 
year or the date closest to that (e.g. 29/12). US 
dollars are converted to 1995 US dollars using the 
World Economic Outlook GDP Deflator for the USA 
found at: http://www.econstats.com/weo/V005.
htm.




It is common to see increasing car use 
linked to increases in wealth. This was re-
ferred to by Lave (1992) as an “irresistible 
force”. In the light of the “peak car use” 
phenomenon that is now observable in 
many developed nations and increasingly 
in the cities of those nations (Newman and 
Kenworthy, 2011), it is interesting to look 
at the relationship between urban pas-
senger transport, especially car use, and 
the development of GDP in cities. The sig-
nificance goes well beyond the academic 
interest in something once considered 
virtually a law of transport (Schafer and 
Victor, 2000). The global agencies dealing 
with the difficult question of whether the 
world can adjust to meet the challenge of 
climate change, must find a mechanism to 
enable GDP and transport to be decoupled. 
Technological advances can play their part 
in reducing carbon for each kilometre of 
travel, but this is much more likely to be 
effective if at the same time the amount 
of kilometres travelled is also decreasing. 
Without this their global models will nev-
er be able to incorporate a valid way of 
achieving a future with a maximum of 2o 
C of temperature rise (Fulton et al, 2013). 
With the update of the Millennium Cit-
ies Database for Sustainable Transport 
(Kenworthy and Laube, 2001) being un-
dertaken by the author, it is now possi-
ble to examine this point in more detail. 
Both car use per capita (vehicle kilome-
tres) and GDP per capita for two years 
(1995/6 and 2005/6) for forty-two cit-
ies in the USA, Australia, Canada, Europe 
and Asia are now available on a consist-
ent methodological basis.1  These cities 
have 2005/6 GDPs per capita (in 1995 
US dollars) between $55,070 (Washing-
ton DC) and $18,823 (Hong Kong).2  As 
well, we can examine similar relationships 
between total motorised mobility in cities 
involving passenger kilometres of travel 
by cars, motorcycles and public transport.
There are two ways of undertaking this 
analysis. One is to express all GDPs for 
cities for both 1995 and 2005, in this case 
in real US dollars (pegged to 1995, since 
the initial set of data were for that year). 
This is particularly important if one is try-
ing to make comparisons between cities 
in different countries, for example, which 
cities are higher or lower on particular 
variables related to wealth. In doing this, 
however, we also introduce factors into the 
analysis which are not consistent between 
countries. What affects the value of the US 
dollar on the international money markets 
may not be affecting, for example, the 
value of the Euro in the same way. De-
pending on the aims of the analysis, con-
versions between currencies can introduce 
distortions, which confuse the results. In 
this analysis the aim is to investigate the 
possible extent to which growth in mobility 
and especially car mobility may have de-
coupled from growth in wealth or GDP per 
capita. It is thus very important to ensure 
that both the mobility variables and the 
wealth data for these cities are kept within 
the same domain and are not affected by 
divergent external factors that can come 
into play in converting to a common cur-
rency. In the central analysis in this pa-
per real GDPs in local currencies have 
therefore been used (pegged to 1995).
Car vehicle kilometres and growth in 
metropolitan GDP
In order to see how the development of 
car vehicle kilometres in this global sam-
ple of cities relates to the development 
of their GDP, this research has calculated 
the car kilometres driven to generate one 
unit of real GDP in local currency in 1995 
and 2005 for each metropolitan area (e.g. 
for US cities this was car kilometres per 
real 1995 US dollar of GDP and in Euro-
pean cities using the common currency it 
was car kilometres per real 1995 Euro of 
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Figure 1. Percentage change in car kilometres travelled per unit of real GDP in 
forty-two cities (real local currencies).
GDP and so on). To do this the per capita 
GDP for each metropolitan area was cal-
culated based on the functional economic 
region or labour market area for each city 
and expressed in 1995 real local curren-
cies. This was then divided into the per 
capita car vehicle kilometres for that year. 
Local currencies were converted to real 
1995 values using the World Economic 
Outlook GDP Deflator found at: http://
www.econstats.com/weo/V005.htm. for 
the country in which each city is located. 
The main aim here was not to com-
pare the relative amount of car driving 
per unit of real GDP between cities, but 
how the amount of driving per unit of 
GDP has changed over the ten year pe-
riod between 1995 and 2005 in each city. 
This can be expressed as a percentage.
Table 1 shows the results of this analysis 
for the forty-two cities under considera-
tion. Importantly, it shows the decadal per-
centage change from 1995 to 2005 in the 
amount of car driving per unit of real GDP. 
The city with the biggest drop in car driving 
per unit of GDP (50% in Madrid) is shown 
first, with the last city being Berlin, which 
was one of only three cities that showed 
an increase in this factor (15%), the other 
two being Frankfurt and Vancouver, but 
the increase in both these cases was very 
small (1.3% and 2.1% respectively). Ber-
lin was the only city in the analysis to ex-
perience a fall in real GDP per capita in 
local currencies (20,678€ to 20,463€), 
which when also combined with an in-
crease in car use per capita, resulted in the 
15% increase in car kilometres per unit of 
GDP. In the case of Vancouver, there was 
only a tiny increase in real GDP per capita 
(CAD$35,213 to CAD$35,511), while car 
use also grew a little. Frankfurt was similar.
Figure 1 shows the percentage chang-
es in car kilometres per unit of real GDP 
for each city and reveals the extent to 
which car use decoupled from GDP over 
the 10-year period. It shows that thir-
ty-nine out of the forty-two cities re-
duced in their car kilometres per GDP 
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Table 1. Car kilometres travelled per unit of GDP in real local currencies, 1995-
2005.
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Figure 2. Car use (vehicle kilometres) per dollar of GDP in US, Australia/New 
Zealand, Canadian, European and Asian cities, 1995 and 2005 (using real 1995 
US dollars).
by an average of 24% (across the entire 
forty-two cities the decline was 21%). 
These cities have thus been able to grow 
their economies while experiencing major 
reductions in the relative amount of car 
driving associated with this wealth crea-
tion (see further section on links to peak 
car use below). Overall, the data suggest 
that in the overwhelming majority of cases 
where real per capita GDP has grown, this 
wealth creation has decoupled from car use.
Despite the issues that may be introduced 
in converting all currencies to a common 
one, it is still interesting to get an idea of 
the comparative amount of car driving per 
unit of real GDP between cities in differ-
ent regions. In this case the GDPs were 
all converted to 1995 US dollars to enable 
these cross-city comparisons. Figure 2 
provides these data averaged by region. 
In all regions except Asia, the car kilome-
tres driven dollar of GDP have declined 
from 1995 to 2005, with the European cit-
ies showing on average the least decline. 
Here we also see that in 2005, US cities 
experienced by far the most car use for 
every dollar of generated GDP, Australian 
cities were a little more efficient in this re-
spect, while Canadian cities were clearly 
lower than both their US and Australian 
counterparts. European cities needed less 
than half the car use to generate the same 
amount of GDP as in US cities. These have 
been the same patterns observed since 
we began collecting the city data from the 
1960’s (Newman and Kenworthy, 1989). 
The two relatively wealthy Asian cities of 
Singapore and Hong Kong had about one-
fifth of the car use per GDP as the US cit-
ies in 2005. Similar patterns are evident 
in 1995, except that the gap between 
the Asian cities and the rest of the cities 
was much greater in 1995 than in 2005 
(these Asian cities increased in their car 
kilometres per dollar of GDP while all the 
other regions declined). A similar situa-
tion is observable between the Canadian 
and European cities because of the small 
relative decline in car kilometres per dol-
lar of GDP experienced in European cities.
In interpreting the results in Figure 2, 
there may also be specific economic cir-
cumstances, which could have relevance 
to the observations. For example, in the 
USA while national GDP per capita has ris-
en considerably, the bulk of that econom-
ic growth has been within already very 
wealthy population segments. Meanwhile, 
the period from 1999 to 2009 saw a decline 
of 5% in real median household income 
and by 2011 real median household income 
12 World Transport Policy and Practice
Volume  19.4 October 2013
Figure 3. Annual per capita car kilometres in forty-two cities, 1995 and 2005.
in the USA was at the lowest level it has 
been since 1995 (http://www.profitconfidential.
com/economic-analysis/american-real-incomes-fall-
to-1995-levels/ accessed June 25, 2013). 
If most economic growth is accruing to 
very high income people while the bulk 
of households are not really getting any 
wealthier in real terms, then one might 
expect that (a) these already very high 
income people are not needing to drive 
more just because they are now even more 
wealthy, while (b) the average person is 
roughly as rich in real terms as before and 
therefore possibly driving about the same 
as well. The net effect in both cases would 
be a decline in car kilometres per dol-
lar of real GDP. The results thus do leave 
scope for more investigation and research.
Links to peak car use
Peak car use appears to be happening due 
to a combination of factors relating to the 
growth of the knowledge/services econ-
omy, the urban youth culture and use of 
social media, an increasing popularity of 
urban locations with rising urban densities 
and a revival in the use of transit, espe-
cially urban rail (Florida, 2010; Newman 
and Kenworthy, 2011). These can all be 
contributing to the decoupling of car use 
from GDP. Of course, it is possible that 
GDP and car use could be decoupled, but 
with both still growing, albeit with GDP 
growing more strongly to give the effect of 
lower vehicle kilometres per unit of GDP. 
Figure 3 explores this in more detail by ex-
amining the actual changes in car vehicle 
kilometres per capita for each of the forty-
two cities in this analysis between 1995 
and 2005. The data are sorted from lowest 
to highest according to the 1995 values. 
A close examination of the chart reveals 
that twelve out of the forty-two cities did 
in fact not only achieve relative reduc-
tions in the amount of car driving associ-
ated with their GDP growth, but also ab-
solute declines in per capita car kilometres 
of driving (Atlanta, Houston, San Fran-
cisco, Los Angeles, Oslo, Toronto, Mon-
treal, Zürich, Stockholm, London, Vienna, 
Graz). The average decrease in per capita 
car use for these twelve cities was 6.4%. 
Furthermore, sixteen of the cities experi-
enced per capita increases in car vehicle 
kilometres of less than 10% over a decade, 
suggesting a significant slow down in the 
growth rate of per capita car kilometres. 
The average increase between 1995 and 
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Figure 4. Relationship between per capita metropolitan GDP and annual car kilo-
metres per capita for forty-two cities in 2005.
2005 was 5.4% for San Diego, Phoenix, 
Chicago, Calgary, New York, Melbourne, 
Sydney, Vancouver, Wellington, Geneva, 
Stuttgart, Düsseldorf, Hamburg, Madrid, 
Brussels and Hong Kong. The remaining 
fourteen out of the forty-two cities in this 
analysis grew in car use per capita between 
1995 and 2005 by an average of 20.8%.
We have shown elsewhere that the av-
erage decadal percentage increase in 
car vehicle kilometres per capita in cit-
ies from 1960 to 1970 was 42%, from 
1970-1980, 26% and 1980 to 1990, 23% 
(Newman and Kenworthy, 2011). Over-
all, in this analysis of forty-two cities from 
1995 to 2005, those that increased in car 
vehicle kilometres per capita did so by 
12.6%, or about half the 1980 to 1990 
figure. For the forty-two cities as a whole, 
car use per capita increased on average 
by only 7.2%, or less than one-third as 
was typical for the 1980s in similar cities.
As mentioned at the beginning, one of the 
persistent ideas in the literature is that car 
use is strongly related to GDP. In our pre-
vious research on whole cities we found 
little relationship between wealth and 
car use (Newman and Kenworthy, 1999). 
For 1995 no statistically significant cor-
relation between GDP per capita and car 
kilometres travelled per capita could be 
seen in the fifty-eight higher income cit-
ies with a GDP per capita over $11,000 
(US$1995). For the twenty-six lower in-
come cities with GDP per capita less than 
$11,000 there was a significant relation-
ship, with car use increasing with GDP 
per capita (Kenworthy and Laube, 2001).
If we examine the correlation between 
annual car kilometres of travel per cap-
ita and GDP per capita using the later 
2005 data for the forty-two wealthy cit-
ies here, there appears to be a very weak 
positive relationship, but with a huge 
amount of scatter in the data. As a result, 
GDP per capita, at least in wealthier cit-
ies, is an extremely poor predictor of car 
use per capita. For example, at $40,000 
GDP per capita, Figure 4 shows car use 
ranging from less than 3,000 kilometres 
per capita up to over 18,000 km, with a 
number of cities lying somewhere between 
these extremes. This question of the rela-
tionship between mobility and GDP is re-
turned to later in the discussion section.
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Table 2. Total motorised passenger kilometres per unit of GDP in real local cur-
rencies, 1995-2005.
simply being replaced by other forms of 
mobility in generating the GDP of an ur-
ban region? In this case we combine an-
nual car, motorcycle and public transport 
passenger kilometres and express this per 
unit of real GDP in the local currency. The 
annual public transport passenger kilo-
metres for each city is for the entire sys-
tem (all modes and all operators collected 
carefully from the relevant organisations).
Total motorised personal mobility and 
GDP
With the reducing amount of car use (ve-
hicle kilometres) associated with every 
real unit of GDP, it is interesting to see 
whether this also applies to the total 
amount of personal motorised travel that 
people have to undertake to meet their 
needs in cities. In other words, is car use 
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Figure 5. Percentage change in total motorised passenger kilometres travelled 
per unit of real GDP in forty-two cities (local currencies).
Table 2 shows the result for 1995 and 
2005 for the forty-two cities ordered ac-
cording to the largest reduction in total 
motorised mobility per unit of GDP (Hel-
sinki, -50%) to Berlin with a 19% in-
crease. It demonstrates again that the 
large majority of cities needed signifi-
cantly less total personal motorised mobil-
ity in 2005 relative to the amount of real 
GDP they generated, compared to 1995. 
There are only seven out of the forty-two 
cities that increased in this factor. Over-
all, in the thirty-five cities that reduced 
in this factor, the average reduction was 
26% over the ten years, while across the 
entire sample, including those cities that 
increased, the overall reduction in motor-
ised mobility per unit of GDP was 20%.
Figure 5 presents the percentage chang-
es for each city. The seven cities to have 
increased in total motorised mobility per 
unit of GDP from 1995 to 2005 were, 
Stuttgart, Oslo, Munich, Hong Kong, 
Frankfurt, Vancouver, Berlin and. In the 
case of Hong Kong the mobility increase 
per capita was all in transit, with combined 
car and motorcycle passenger kilometres 
per capita declining. In the other six cit-
ies that increased, all the forms of pas-
senger mobility per capita rose. In fact, 
only eight cities out of the forty-two cities 
actually declined in per capita total mo-
torised mobility from 1995 to 2005 (Graz, 
Stockholm, Melbourne, Montreal, Toron-
to, Atlanta, Houston, and Los Angeles). 
In summary, in 83% of the cities in 
the analysis, total motorised mobil-
ity relative to GDP reduced or de-
coupled between 1995 and 2005.
Figure 6 groups the cities into their respec-
tive regions and uses real 1995 US dollars 
for cross-city comparisons. It shows that 
in 1995, Australian cities had the highest 
level of overall personal mobility per dollar 
of GDP. This was followed closely by the 
US cities, then the Canadian cities with a 
big drop in this factor, then the Europe-
an cities with another big drop and finally 
the Asian cities which were lower again, 
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Figure 6. Total motorised mobility (passenger kilometres) per dollar of GDP in 
US, Australia/New Zealand, Canadian, European and Asian cities, 1995 and 2005 
(using real 1995 US dollars).
but by a lesser margin than the other dif-
ferences. By 2005, all the groups of cit-
ies had reduced their personal mobility 
requirements relative to GDP, except the 
Asian cities, which went up. This meant 
that by 2005 the two Asian cities of Singa-
pore and Hong Kong on average had more 
personal mobility per dollar of GDP than 
the European cities and were almost equal 
to the Canadian cities. Also the US cit-
ies overtook the Australian cities in 2005 
by a tiny margin to become the leading 
cities in this factor, but the remainder of 
the comparative differences were similar 
to 1995. In general, in comparing 1995 
and 2005 there seems to be a “flattening” 
process at work so that the differences in 
motorised personal mobility levels relative 
to GDP are becoming less pronounced.
Discussion
This paper provides a global perspective 
on the important topic of whether urban 
economies can grow whilst reducing the 
overall mobility and especially car mobility 
associated with that growth. It does this 
through a snapshot for only two years of 
data for each city, albeit separated by a 
period of ten years. However, research by 
Kooshian and Winkelman (2011) also sup-
ports the proposition that GDP has in fact 
decoupled from private mobility, certainly 
in the United States, by showing a per-
spective dating back as far as 1945. They 
suggest that the strength of this decou-
pling is likely to continue into the future. 
Figure 7, taken from their work, shows the 
national index of Vehicle Miles Travelled 
(VMT) against GDP for the USA from 1950 
to 2010. It can be clearly seen that 1995 
was the point where GDP in the US separat-
ed from its almost perfect correlation with 
VMT growth in the post-World War 2 period.
They go further in their analysis by show-
ing the VMT per dollar of real GDP from 
1945 to 2010 in the USA, as well as a pro-
jection out to 2030 (Figure 8). It is again 
clear that 1995 was essentially the peak 
in the travel intensity of the US economy 
and from that year on, notwithstanding 
some small variations, less vehicle travel 
was needed for every dollar of GDP gen-
erated. Based on Figure 8, between 1995 
and 2005 there was approximately an 8% 
drop in the VMT per dollar of GDP in the 
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Figure 7. US national VMT indexed against national GDP, 1950-2010.
Source: Kooshian and Winkelman (2011)
Figure 8. Vehicle Miles Travelled per dollar of GDP in the USA from 1945 to 
2030. Source: Kooshian and Winkelman (2011)
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Figure 9. Decoupling of GDP from Vehicle Miles of Travel in Portland, Oregon.
Source: Kooshian and Winkelman (2011)
3 These public transport data have been carefully 
collected for all modes and operators for all the 
cities in the sample in each year and the speeds 
weighted by the number of passenger hours spent 
in each mode (see Newman et al (2013) for details 
of cities involved). The average road speed is the 
24 hour/7days road network speed mostly derived 
from computer models in each city. These data are 
the results of my and my colleagues’ comparative 
research on cities over the last 30 years (e.g. New-
man and Kenworthy, 1989; Kenworthy and Laube, 
1999; Kenworthy and Laube, 2001), including on-
going updated data for 2005, in the process of being 
progressively published at present.
ever, one major underlying factor not 
captured in their work is likely to be the 
reductions in comparative investment in 
infrastructure for freeways compared to 
public transport, which seem to be pro-
pelling a rise in public transport patron-
age across all these cities (Newman et al, 
2013). Figure 11 shows the increase in 
public transport passenger kilometres per 
capita by region for these cities from 1995 
to 2005 (US cities rose 16%, Australian 
cities 11%, Canadian cities 12%, Euro-
pean cities 22% and Asian cities 19%). 
The key data seem to be an improvement 
in the relative speed of public transport 
to traffic (average road speed) and espe-
cially rail speed, as shown in Figure 12.3 
It is clear from these data that the rise in 
importance of rail in cities is largely behind 
this increase in the relative speed of public 
transport compared to general traffic. In 
USA. By comparison, the data on the ten 
US cities in this study showed a 26% de-
cline. The data used by Kooshian and Win-
kelman represent total VMT, not just pri-
vate passenger vehicles, so it seems that:
 
(a) the decoupling effect is less when 
freight and commercial traffic is factored in 
and, 
(b) the effect is more pronounced in cities.
Their own data for cities (e.g. Figures 
9 and 10) also show a stronger de-
coupling effect, in the case of Portland 
(26%) and Washington DC (20%).  Fur-
thermore, the modelled national projec-
tion in Figure 8 shows a sustained and 
steady decline in the total travel intensity 
of the US economy, as far out as 2030.
The research in this paper covering forty-
two cities in seventeen countries, suggests 
that this decoupling of car use and total 
private motorised travel from GDP growth, 
which is so clear in both the USA as a 
whole and within its individual cities, is 
likely to be a more widespread global phe-
nomenon, in at least the developed world.
The mechanisms underlying the results 
reported here are likely to involve a com-
plex array of factors. Kooshian and Win-
kelman (2011) mention factors such as 
demographic shifts, fuel prices, conges-
tion, growth of the service sector and 
telecommuting and e-commerce as im-
portant in understanding the trend. How-
19 World Transport Policy and Practice
Volume  19.4 October 2013
Figure 10. Decoupling of GDP from Vehicle Miles of Travel in Washington DC.
Source: Kooshian and Winkelman (2011)
Figure 11. Public transport passenger kilometres per capita by region, 1995 and 
2005.
Source: Author’s own data from update of Millennium Cities Database for Sustainable 
Transport.
the absence of any area-wide congestion 
control in any city this is hardly surprising, 
because buses suffer a worse fate than 
cars in congested conditions in terms of 
providing a speed-competitive mid-level 
public transport option. Yet it is the unre-
strained use of cars in peak periods, which 
causes the congestion that so damages 
bus competitiveness. An even greater im-
provement in the relative speed of public 
transport could be gained by controlling 
congestion in a systematic way so that bus-
es could compete effectively in speed terms 
with cars (Bradley and Kenworthy, 2012).
It should also be noted that when public 
transport travel rises, it is not simply that 
one passenger kilometre by public trans-
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Figure 12. The relationship between overall public transport system speed and 
rail system speed in cities compared to their general road traffic speed, 1960 to 
2005.
Source: Author’s own data from update of Millennium Cities Database for Sustainable 
Transport and Kenworthy and Laube (1999).
port replaces one passenger kilometre 
driven by cars. Neff (1996) and our own 
work (Newman and Kenworthy, 1999) has 
shown that there is a “transit leverage ef-
fect” whereby one passenger kilometre 
by public transport replaces multiple pas-
senger kilometres by car. It can be sug-
gested then that as public transport gains 
in relative importance in urban mobility we 
might expect that the decoupling effect 
between GDP and car travel should actual-
ly strengthen. Essentially, public transport 
is a much more efficient and cost-effective 
way of providing urban mobility needs. 
Even if public transport mobility increases, 
it is quite possible that both car mobility and 
total motorised mobility per dollar of GDP 
can decline due to public transport’s ability 
to replace multiple kilometres of car travel.
This change in priorities, as cities rec-
ognise the greater value in public trans-
port investment as well as the need for 
congestion control, enables us to see a 
major policy direction that could be the 
driving mechanism to enable cities of all 
kinds to continue their growth in wealth 
whilst decoupling from car use growth. 
Conclusion
The data presented in this paper suggest 
that in general, personal mobility in rela-
tively wealthy cities, and in particular car 
vehicle kilometres of travel, have decou-
pled from GDP growth. This trend is sup-
ported by independent research from the 
USA at both a national and city level. The 
results also appear to be in line with the 
idea of peak car use in these more pros-
perous cities around the world, with evi-
dence that many cities experienced a de-
crease in car vehicle kilometres per capita 
from 1995 to 2005, while many others 
increased by an average of only around 
5% in the 10 years, a major reduction 
on growth rates in previous decades. The 
amount of total personal motorised mobil-
ity (car, motorcycle and public transport 
passenger kilometres) associated with 
generating one unit of real GDP appears to 
be also diminishing in the majority of cas-
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es, and the differences between wealthy 
cities in this factor are also declining. 
American and Australian cities, however, 
remain significantly higher than cities in 
Canada, Europe and Asia. Further research 
is needed to better understand these ob-
served phenomena and their implications. 
This would include more detailed exami-
nation of Indian and Chinese cities to see 
if they too may be beginning to decouple 
transport from GDP as they move to sig-
nificant investments in rail over roads. The 
‘peak car’ phenomenon may well there-
fore be helping us to imagine a future 
where wealth can continue to be created 
globally whilst reducing the use of cars, 
oil and their damaging global impacts. 
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